Andrew R. Quintana v. The State of Utah : Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
Andrew R. Quintana v. The State of Utah : Petition
for Writ of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Charlene Barlow; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondents.
Lynn R. Brown; Richard G. Uday; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation








IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 
Priority No. 13 
mf>f 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880406-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
LYNN R. BROWN 
RICHARD G. UDAY 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Appellant/Petitioner 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 
Priority No. 13 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880406-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
LYNN R. BROWN 
RICHARD G. UDAY 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Appellant/Petitioner 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
P 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW , 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
OPINION BELOW 
JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
B. PERTINENT FACTS . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE OPINION BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ERRONEOUSLY EVALUATED THE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING 
STATEMENT COMMENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE COURT 
ORDER, IGNORED CASES FROM THIS COURT ADDRESSING 
THE ISSUES, AND IMPERMISSIBLY DENIED MR. QUINTANA 
HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE STATE AND 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO 
DISTINGUISH OPENING STATEMENT MISCONDUCT FROM 
CLOSING ARGUMENT MISCONDUCT 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY 
ADDRESS THE PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPLY THE 
CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES 







State v. Quintana, No. 880406-CA (10/4/89) 
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing 
Complete Opening Statement of Prosecutor 
Pages 9-16 of Appellant's Opening Brief 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Cody v. Mustang Oil Tool Co., 595 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1980) 14, 15 
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) 14, 16 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) 11 
State v. Nettleton, 400 P.2d 301 (Wash. 1965) . . . . 15 
State v. Quintana, No. 880406-CA (October 4, 1989) . . passim 
State v. Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Utah 1987) 10 
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) . . . . . . 10 
State v. Smith, 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937) . . . . . . 15 
State v. Thomas, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah 1989) . . 9, 10, 17, 
20 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 9, 10 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) 11, 16, 17, 
18, 20 
State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 1986) 10 
State v. Ubaldi, 462 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1983) 12, 13 
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973) 10, 16 
State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981) 13, 14, 16 
United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 
1985) 10, 11 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States . . . v, 8 
Article I, § 7, Constitution of Utah v, 8 
Article I, § 12, Constitution of Utah v, 8 
ii 
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953 as amended) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as amended) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989) 2 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 3 
Rule 45(c), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court If 2 
iii 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the decision of the Court of Appeals—that a 
prosecutor's opening statement comments which informed jurors of 
critical identification testimony previously suppressed by the trial 
court constituted harmless error—an erroneous ruling and in 
conflict with decisions from this Court in that the Court of 
Appeals' decision (A) failed to distinguish opening statement 
misconduct from closing argument miscondcut, (B) failed to 
adequately address the prosecutor's violation of the trial court's 
order, and (C) failed to apply the correct legal standard to the 
circumstances of this case? 
iv 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides in 
pertinent part: 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
v 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 
Priority No. 13 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880406-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Quintana, 
No. 880406-CA (filed October 4, 1989) is attached as Addendum A to 
this Petition. A copy of that Court's order denying the 
Appellant's timely Petition for Rehearing is attached hereto as 
Addendum B. 
JURISDICTION 
Following the Court of Appeals' decision of October 4, 
1989 affirming Mr. Quintana's conviction, a Petition for Rehearing 
was timely filed with the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Rule 45(c) 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, the filing of that Petition 
tolled the time for filing the Petition for Writ of Certiorari until 
thirty days following the denial of that Petition for Rehearing. 
The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing on 
November 13, 1989. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari therefore 
is timely filed in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Jurisdiction is bestowed on this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellant, Andrew R. Quintana, appealed from a judgment 
and conviction for Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (L953 as 
amended), following a jury trial held May 24-25, 1988, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of 
Mr. Quintana in a not-for-publication opinion on October 4, 1989. A 
copy of that opinion is attached at Addendum A. In that opinion, 
the court held that despite the trial court having granted a 
pretrial suppression motion to preclude the prosecutor from using 
the eyewitness identification of Mr. Rains, the prosecutor's opening 
statement pronouncement that Mr. Rains saw the Defendant, in direct 
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contravention of the pretrial suppression order, was harmless error 
under the circumstances of this case. 
In making that ruling, the Court of Appeals failed to 
distinguish opening statement misconduct from closing argument 
misconduct as urged by Mr. Quintana, failed to directly address the 
prosecutor's violation of the trial court's order as urged by 
Mr. Quintana, and failed to apply the correct legal standard urged 
by Mr. Quintana to the facts of the case. Mr. Quintana petitioned 
for rehearing on each of these points. However, that petition was 
denied without comment by the Court of Appeals. 
Mr. Quintana seeks review of the decision on each of 
these questions noting that the Court of Appeals' decision is in 
conflict with several cited opinions from this Court and involves 
important questions of state and federal law which should be settled 
by this Court. Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (1987). 
B. PERTINENT FACTS 
On September 25, 1987, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the 
Ted John family left their home at 1162 Emery Avenue, Salt Lake 
County, for a two-day trip to southern Utah (R. 118 at 27, 39). 
When they returned home the evening of September 27, 1987, the John 
family found a note on their door from the police indicating their 
home had been burglarized; they were requested to contact the police 
(R. 118 at 29). The Johns complained that stereo equipment 
including patch cords and a canister vacuum cleaner were missing 
(R. 118 at 31). The three-piece stereo unit consisted of an 
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aggregate bulk of at least 14x15x10 inches and an aggregate weight 
of 16-21 pounds (R. 118 at 31-32, 43-44). The vacuum cleaner was 
described as 3-4 feet high and 14-18 inches across (R. 118 at 31). 
Value of the missing items totalled $900 (R. 118 at 31). 
On Sunday morning, September 27, 1987, a neighbor across 
the street from the John residence observed a burgandy Mazda pickup 
truck parked on the street and an individual standing on the porch 
of the John home (R. 118 at 57-59). This woman, Patricia Rains, 
watched the individual for approximately five minutes; she observed 
him knock on the door, look in the mail box, and peer into the large 
picture window of the home (R. 118 at 59-60). She believed this 
person was stranded (R. 118 at 68). She noted that after standing 
on the porch for several minutes, the individual returned to the 
Mazda pickup truck and drove away. 
Patricia Rains1 husband, Calvin Dean Rains, also observed 
the person on the porch; he felt the person looked "suspicious" 
(R. 118 at 87). A couple of minutes after the person had left in 
the Mazda truck, Mr. Rains left in his own truck to go to the 
grocery store (R. 118 at 89-90). As Mr. Rains turned the corner of 
his block, he spotted the burgandy pickup parked directly across 
from an alley way which ran behind the John residence (R. 118 at 
91). Mr. Rains could not see the person but decided to stop and 
observe, and, within a few moments, he saw a person come out of the 
alley way (R. 118 at 92-93). 
Mr. Rains was 75-80 yards away from the individual but 
believed him to be the man that was earlier on the Johns1 porch 
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(R. 118 at 93). Mr. Rains believed the man was carrying something 
under his shirt; he noted a large bulge on his left-hand side and 
that the person was carrying his arm underneath it (R. 118 at 94). 
Mr. Rains returned home, spoke with his wife, and she called the 
police (R. 118 at 95-96). 
Police officer Chris Ahearn responded to the call just 
before noon and took descriptions of the suspect and the vehicle 
from Mr. and Mrs. Rains (R. 118 at 46-47). The description given 
was a male Hispanic, dark hair, five feet seven inches tall, 
approximately 130 pounds (R. 118 at 47). The vehicle was reported 
as a Mazda pickup truck, maroon in color with a damaged grill and a 
license number of 5600AK (R. 118 at 47, 50). Officer Ahearn 
verified the appearance of a burglary and that someone had walked 
through the weeds in the alley way behind the John residence (R. 118 
at 47-49). 
Officer Ahearn prepared a report of his investigation; 
that report did not include the name of a suspect (R. 118 at 47). 
At approximately 3:00 p.m. that same day, Officer Robert Robinson 
spotted a 1983 maroon Mazda pickup truck with license number 3600AK 
and pulled it over as the suspect vehicle in the burglary (R. 119 at 
4). Officer Robinson indicated that the dispatch included a 
description of a short male Hispanic, in his twenties, short black 
hair, wearing a tee shirt and shorts, but no name (R. 119 at 5, 13). 
The driver of the vehicle pulled over by Officer Robinson 
was Andrew R. Quintana (R. 119 at 5). Mr. Quintana is five foot 
three and one-half inches, is a male Hispanic in his twenties, and 
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on this day was wearing corduroy shorts (R. 119 at 9, 49); yet, 
Officer Robinson did not arrest Mr. Quintana (R. 119 at 16). He 
allowed Mr. Quintana to leave on foot, but he impounded the vehicle 
additionally noting that a patch cord was present on the passenger 
seat (R. 119 at 8-9). 
Prior to trial, police officers requested that Mr. Rains 
come down to the police station to see if he could identify a 
suspect in the burglary case. He consented and, upon arrival at the 
station, was seated at an officer's desk. Mr. Andrew Quintana was 
then brought out by an officer and instructed to walk past Mr. Rains 
while seated at his desk. Mr. Rains told the police that 
Mr. Quintana was the same man he had seen on the porch and in the 
alley (R. 27-28). 
Because of the suggestive procedure used by police to 
show a single suspect to a witness, Mr. Quintana filed a motion in 
limine to suppress the identification testimony of Mr. Rains 
(R. 24-28, 31-35). The trial court took the motion under advisement 
(R. 39) and later issued an order granting the motion to suppress 
the witness' identification and prohibiting its use at trial (R. 40) 
At trial, however, the prosecutor stated in his opening 
statement to the jury that Mr. Rains "saw the Defendant come out" 
from the alley behind the John residence (R. 118 at 17). The 
statement drew an immediate objection from defense counsel and a 
conference was held at the bench (R. 118 at 17). The prosecutor 
then continued his opening statement with similar statements of what 
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Mr. Rains had observed (R. 118 at 17-18).-1 Before proceeding with 
his opening statement, defense counsel asked for argument on the 
side bar topic, and the jury was excused to accommodate that request 
(R. 118 at 19). 
Counsel for Mr. Quintana urged that the prosecutor's 
remarks—that Mr. Rains saw the Defendant coming out of the 
alley—left an indelible impression in the jurors' minds that 
Mr. Rains identified Mr. Quintana as the perpetrator of the crimes; 
counsel insisted that the prosecutor's remarks were in direct 
violation of the court's order and moved for a mistrial (R. 118 at 
19-20). After brief argument, the trial court denied the motion 
(R. 118 at 21). 
At trial, Mrs. Rains testified that the man on the porch 
was Andrew Quintana (R. 118 at 61). She later clarified that she 
did not know Mr. Quintana but knew of him, and she admitted that she 
had never met him (R. 118 at 61-62, 69-70). 
The patch cords found in the burgundy pickup truck were 
not positively identified by Mr. John as his patch cords (R. 118 at 
33). Testimony was introduced by Mr. Quintana's mother and brother 
which indicated the patch cords belonged to Jack Quintana, the 
Defendant's brother, and belonged to a portable amplifier which was 
placed into evidence and which he routinely used in his truck 
(R. 99; 119 at 41-42, 45-46). 
1




POINT. THE OPINION BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ERRONEOUSLY EVALUATED THE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING 
STATEMENT COMMENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE COURT 
ORDER, IGNORED CASES FROM THIS COURT ADDRESSING 
THE ISSUES, AND IMPERMISSIBLY DENIED MR. QUINTANA 
HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE STATE AND 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Prior to trial in this case, Mr. Quintana filed a motion 
to suppress the identification of him by one Calvin Dean Rains 
(R. 24-28, 31-35). The trial court granted that motion (R. 40). 
However, during the State's opening statement, the 
prosecutor, despite the court order forbidding Mr. Rains to identify 
Mr. Quintana as the burglar, informed jurors that Mr. Rains saw 
Mr. Quintana come out of the alley behind the burglarized home 
(R. 118 at 17). Mr. Quintana immediately moved for a mistrial 
(R. 118 at 17, 19-20). That motion was denied by the trial court 
(R. 118 at 21) . 
Mr. Quintana appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals 
claiming that the prosecutor's remarks denied him his right to a 
fair trial and required reversal of his convictions. 
The State responded conceding that the prosecutor's 
remarks were contrary to the order of the court and were erroneous. 
Brief of Respondent at 12. The State urged, however, that the error 
was harmless and did not prejudice Mr. Quintana. Id. 
The Court of Appeals on review also found the 
prosecutor's opening statement comments to be highly improper and 
erroneous misconduct. Opinion at 6. Nonetheless, the court found 
- 8 -
that the misconduct did not require reversal. Opinion at 6-7. 
This Court of Appeals1 opinion is ill based. The Court 
of Appeals erroneously evaluated the opening statement comments of 
the prosecutor in direct violation of the court order precluding 
that testimony from reaching the jurors. Competent case law from 
this Court, relied on by Mr. Quintana, was unaddressed by the Court 
of Appeals on two critical issues, and an improper application of 
the law was employed by the Court of Appeals on a third issue. 
Specifically, Mr. Quintana avers that the Court of 
Appeals failed in three critical analyses of this case: (1) failed 
to distinguish opening statement misconduct from closing argument 
misconduct, (2) failed to properly address the prosecutor's 
violation of the court's pretrial order, and (3) failed to apply the 
correct legal standard to the facts of the case. Individually and 
collectively, these errors raise important questions of state and 
federal law, now clouded by this opinion, which should be settled by 
this Court. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted 
to resolve the issues and to afford Mr. Quintana his 
constitutionally mandated fair trial. 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO DISTINGUISH 
OPENING STATEMENT MISCONDUCT FROM CLOSING ARGUMENT 
MISCONDUCT. 
The Court of Appeals relied on State v. Thomas, 111 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah 1989), and State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 
1987), for its decision. Both cases, however, are not dispositive 
of the case at bar, although they do reiterate the two-part test for 
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determining whether a prosecutor's misconduct requires reversal. 
Nonetheless, both State v. Thomas and State v. Tillman, like so many 
other cases in this jurisdiction (see, e.g., State v. Rislow, 736 
P.2d 637 (Utah 1987); State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); and State v. Valdez, 513 
P.2d 422 (Utah 1973)), involve closing argument misconduct of 
prosecutors, not opening statement misconduct. Moreover, none of 
these cases involve the direct violation of court orders as 
occurring in the case at bar. 
In his briefs to the Court of Appeals, Mr. Quintana 
emphasized the distinction between opening and closing arguments. 
Mr. Quintana cited federal and state case law to support the 
violation of his right to a fair trial.2 see Brief of Appellant at 
9-16, enclosed at Addendum D. 
Specifically, Mr. Quintana identified competent support 
that a difference exists between prosecutorial misconduct in opening 
statements and those which occur in closing arguments. The Eighth 
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1274 
(8th Cir. 1985), reasons that prosecutorial misconduct "made during 
an opening statement makes it more egregious than a similar remark 
would be in a closing argument." The court further pointed out the 
2
 Because Mr. Quintana relied on both federal and state 
law which analytically rely on federal due process analysis—none of 
the cases note reliance on state due process—he believes footnote 
no. 2 at page 6 of the court's opinion is in error. However, 
Mr. Quintana also has urged that any harmless error analysis was 
improper. See subpoint B, infra. If, however, this Court 
disagrees, the federal standard should be evaluated as well. 
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distinction between the two is that improprieties during closing 
arguments may be excused as product of provocation while opening 
statements take place in a less volatile atmosphere and are presumed 
to be planned. Id. 
Additionally, Mr. Quintana relied on State v. Troy, 688 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1984). State v. Troy is a rare opinion among the 
many prosecutorial misconduct cases in this jurisdiction where 
opening statement comments were attacked as prejudicial misconduct. 
This Court reversed the conviction in that case, particularly 
relying on the opening statement remarks.3 
The Court of Appeals1 opinion failed to address these 
critical distinctions between opening statement and closing argument 
misconduct. Further, the court ignored the Troy opinion. 
Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted 
so that this Court may review the error and address this important 
issue. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY 
ADDRESS THE PROSECUTOR'S VIOLATION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDER. 
Perhaps even more disquieting than the error noted above 
is that the Court of Appeals failed to address the question of the 
3
 Only one other case, State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1253-55 (Utah 1988), discusses alleged opening statement 
misconduct. That case involved a discrepancy between the facts 
proven and the opening statement proffer. The Court termed the 
discrepancy as "so slight that it was not error." Id. at 1254. 
Notably, the Lafferty case is readily distinguishable in any event 
because it did not involve the violation of a trial court's 
suppression order as occurred in the case at bar. 
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prosecutor's behavior in defiance of the trial court's pretrial 
order to the contrary. 
Applying a harmless error analysis to a prosecutor's 
direct violation of a court order is contrary to the ends of justice 
in this individual case as well as all other future cases,.4 In 
State v. Ubaldi, 462 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1983), cert, denied,, 464 U.S. 
916 (1983)/ the Connecticut Supreme Court explained its refusal to 
apply a harmless error analysis under similar circumstances: 
The ultimate implication of [the harmless error 
analysis] argument is that a state's attorney may 
choose deliberately to ignore any trial court 
ruling just as long as the state has amassed 
overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt and 
the state's attorney's misconduct relates only to 
a portion of that evidence. We decline to place 
such a restraint on the ability of this court to 
defend the integrity of the judicial system. 
Id. at 1007. 
The Ubaldi court recognized the remedies and rationales 
utilized in other jurisdictions on this issue and proffered the 
following: 
According to some authorities, the evil of 
overzealous prosecutors is more appropriately 
combatted through contempt sanctions, disciplinary 
boards or other means. This court, however, has 
long been of the view that it is ultimately 
responsible for the enforcement of court rules in 
prosecutorial misconduct cases. Upsetting a 
criminal conviction is a drastic step, but it is 
4
 Mr. Quintana does not suggest by advancing this 
argument that the facts against him were overwhelming. Mr, Quintana 
continues to aver that the State's case against him was less than 
compelling and that the prosecutorial misconduct, when analyzed 
properly, demanded the mistrial motion be granted. See argument, 
subpoint C, infra. 
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the only feasible deterrent to flagrant 
prosecutorial misconduct in defiance of a trial 
court ruling. 
Id. at 1009. The Ubaldi court then offerred an explanation of why 
the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Quintana is incorrect and 
why it ill serves justice. The Ubaldi court noted: 
We are mindful of the sage admonition that 
appellate rebuke without reversal ignores the 
reality of the adversary system of justice. 'The 
deprecatory words we use in our opinions . . . are 
purely ceremonial.' Government counsel, employing 
such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win 
victories, will gladly pay the small price of a 
ritualistic verbal spanking. 'The practice [of 
verbal criticism without judicial action]— 
recalling the bitter tears shed by the walrus as 
he ate the oysters—breeds a deplorably cynical 
attitude towards the judiciary.' Moreover, 
' [deliberate prosecutorial misconduct is 
presumably infrequent; to invalidate convictions 
in the few cases where this is proved, even on a 
fairly low showing of materiality, will have a 
relatively small impact on the desired finality of 
judgments and will deter conduct undermining the 
integrity of the judicial system.' 
Id. (citations omitted; brackets by the court).5 
Importantly, cases from this Court support the view of 
the Connecticut Supreme Court outlined in Ubaldi. In State v. 
Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981), the prosecutor raised the 
appellant's failure to testify after the trial court repeatedly 
sustained objections to the admission of such evidence. After 
concluding that the prosecutor's conduct violated the appellant's 
5
 It is not insignificant that the Court of Appeals' 
opinion in this case was designated as "not for publication" 
choosing to even further spare the prosecutor the slight 
embarrassment of the judicial slap of his wrist and providing 
further fodder for such behavior. 
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right to remain silent, this Court found reversible error, stating: 
The continued attempts by the prosecutor to put 
the defendant's silence before the jury after his 
having been advised of his right to remain silent 
amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. 
The references to defendant's silence are 
fundamental error, which could have affected the 
result and are therefore prejudicial. 
Id. at 147 
In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980), a capital 
case, the trial court instructed an attorney witness that hearsay on 
hearsay evidence would not be permitted in the penalty phase because 
of its lack of probative value. Despite the trial court's ruling, 
the prosecutor and his attorney witness did not honor the ruling. 
Id. at 270. This Court noted: 
We cannot say that the errors that occurred here 
were harmless. An inflammatory obscenity was 
inaccurately imputed to the defendant in the 
penalty phase, which arose from a violation of the 
District Court's order. 
Id. at 271. Because the error worked prejudice to the 
defendant—was not harmless—the Court reversed the sentence of 
death. Id. 
Other jurisdictions concur with the concept that 
violation of a court order to avoid prejudicing the case against the 
accused requires a reversal of the conviction. A Texas court has 
stated: 
When the court has ruled on a point, the same 
evidence should not again be offered in the 
presence of the jury . . . there is a duty upon 
the court to rule decisively. When error creeps 
into the record, the court should instruct the 
jury to disregard it. The judge must do more. He 
must enforce his rulings. Violations of a court's 
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solemn rulings should "lead to serious 
consequences." 
Cody v. Mustang Oil Tool Co., 595 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1980). The Washington Supreme Court was even more direct: 
If we are persuaded that a prosecuting attorney or 
a witness for the state is deliberately trying to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, we will 
assume that he succeeded in his purpose and grant 
a new trial. It would seem that our frequent 
discussions of this subject could, within the near 
future, serve to prevent the reference to a 
defendant as being on parole by all except the 
willful or the congenitally ignorant. 
State v. Nettleton, 400 P.2d 301, 303 n.4 (Wash. 1965). See also 
State v. Smith, 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937) (court reversed conviction 
because the prosecutor asked a question which at a motion in limine 
had been ruled improper by trial court). 
The case against Mr. Quintana involved the single issue 
of identification; all parties agreed on that point. The trial 
court found that the suggestive identification procedure utilized 
with Mr. Rains violated Mr. Quintana's due process rights and ruled 
that his identification must be suppressed. The identification was 
suppressed because its introduction, under the circumstances, would 
have prejudiced Mr. Quintana. Neither the State nor the Court of 
Appeals took issue with the trial court's order suppressing the 
identification. It becomes difficult to understand how the 
suppressed identification, when revealed to the jury by the 
prosecutor during his opening statement, is now cleansed of 
prejudice to Mr. Quintana. Because of the centrality of the issue 
of identification to this case and the violation of the trial 
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court's order, much like the right to remain silent violation in 
State v, Wiswell and the hearsay upon hearsay violation of State v, 
Brown, the harmless error analysis is inappropriate. Mr. Quintana 
was prejudiced. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be 
granted and his convictions should be reversed. 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPLY THE 
CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE. 
The Court of Appeals opined that because the prosecutor 
made only one illicit identification reference to the defendant—and 
that the reference was very early in the two-day trial—that the 
error somehow becomes benign. Opinion at 5-6. The Court of Appeals 
further suggests that compelling evidence otherwise cleansed the 
prosecutorial misconduct error. Both contentions are erroneous. 
In State v. Troy, a case heavily relied on by 
Mr. Quintana and unaddressed by the Court of Appeals, this Court 
stated the two-prong test for reversing a prosecutorial misconduct 
case as follows: 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel 
are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a 
criminal case is, (1) did the remarks call to the 
attention of jurors matters which they would not 
be justified in considering in determining their 
verdict, (2) and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influenced by those remarks. 
688 P.2d at 486 (citing, inter alia, State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d at 
426). A discussion of prong one of the test is unnecessary as all 
parties and even the Court of Appeals agreed that prong was met. 
Opinion at 6. In State v. Troy, this Court offerred additional and 
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very helpful information in analyzing prong two of this two-part 
test. The Court noted: 
Step two is more difficult [than step one] 
and involves a consideration of the circumstances 
of the case as a whole. In making such a 
consideration, it is appropriate to look at the 
evidence of defendant's guilt. 
If proof of defendant's guilt is strong the 
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed 
prejudicial. Likewise in a case with less 
compelling proof, this court will more closely 
scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of the 
jurors is based on their weighing conflicting 
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing 
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood 
that they will be improperly influenced through 
remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the 
jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing 
and interpreting the evidence. They may be 
especially susceptible to influence, and a small 
degree of influence may be sufficient to affect 
the verdict. 
Id. at 486 (emphasis added). 
Notably, the phrasing of prong two in State v. Troy is 
somewhat different than that recited by the Court of Appeals from 
State v. Thomas. Nonetheless, the substance of prong two is the 
same. Critically important in the Court's explanation of prong two 
in State v. Troy, however, is that no deference is to be given to 
the jury's verdict when analyzing a prosecutorial misconduct 
statement; rather, the more conflicting the evidence and/or the more 
susceptible the evidence is of differing interpretations, then the 
greater the likelihood of influence by the remarks or, as phrased in 
State v. Thomas, the more likely there would be a more favorable 
result for the defendant. 
The analysis under prong two of State v. Troy is 
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distinctively different than that applied to a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge. The Court of Appeals properly deferred to the 
jury's verdict in responding to the insufficient evidence claim 
because when conducting that analysis, it is correct to assume the 
jury resolved the conflicts in the evidence in accordance with the 
verdict. However, by examining the Court of Appeals1 treatment of 
the insufficient evidence claim, the number of conflicts in the 
evidence in this case and their significance is displayed. The 
Court of Appeals repeatedly addressed the contradicting evidence by 
indicating that the jurors could have adopted the State's suggested 
inference or could have believed the State's witness(es) and 
disbelieved the defense witness(es). Opinion at 7-9. 
The Court of Appeals' resolution of the insufficient 
evidence claim effectively demonstrates that the evidence against 
Mr. Quintana was conflicting and susceptible of differing 
interpretations. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should have 
applied State v. Troy's second prong recognizing that the 
prosecutor's comments were more than sufficient to influence jurors 
on how to resolve the conflicts. Because the Court of Appeals 
failed to recognize the distinction between a State v. Troy analysis 
and an insufficiency of evidence claim, it did not correctly 
scrutinize the prosecutor's conduct. After all, the Troy Court 
expressly noted that "a small degree of influence may be sufficient 
to affect the verdict." 688 P.2d at 486. 
Mr. Quintana avers that the prosecutor's comments were 
much more than a small degree of improper influence. He believes 
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the error to have been determinative and insists that the Court of 
Appeals misapprehended the facts of the case to the contrary. 
Particularly strained in the opinion is the treatment given to the 
testimony and identification of Mr. Quintana by Mrs. Rains. 
Mr. Quintana especially challenges the court's assessment that she 
supplied the identification evidence buttressed by Mr. Rains1 
"permissible testimony" that the man in the alley was the same man 
both of them saw on the porch moments earlier. Opinion at 6. 
The Court of Appeals failed to address that the actual 
buttressing on this point comes not from Mr. Rains but from the 
prosecutor who made the identification of Mr. Quintana as the 
culprit against the order of the court. Alone, the testimony of 
Mrs. Rains is uncompelling and questionable support for maintaining 
the convictions against Mr. Quintana. Even the Court of Appeals 
recognized that Patricia Rains was not very articulate in describing 
the basis for her recognition of Mr. Quintana. Opinion at 7. While 
her testimony may not have been improbable, a reasonable jury would 
have required more than the information she provided to convict a 
man of these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. They had more, the 
identification provided by the prosecutor in defiance of the court 
order. 
Mr. Quintana also complains that the critical information 
in Mrs. Rains1 testimony that she had supplied the name Andy or 
Andrew Quintana to the police officers during the initial report of 
the burglary is wholly unreliable. Both police officers who 
testified where unable to recall a name supplied in any of the 
- 19 -
reports or broadcasts. That fact alone points out the unlikelihood 
that jurors would have relied heavily on her testimony. As all 
other evidence in this case was contradicted, the illicit 
identification "testimony" by the prosecutor resolved the issue for 
the jurors in favor of the convictions. 
Even assuming the jurors could have believed all of 
Mrs. Rains' testimony regarding Mr. Quintana, that evidence only 
placed him on the porch and in the truck. When Mr. Rains testified, 
the jurors made the connection to Mr. Quintana that was supplied to 
them during the opening statement by the prosecutor. Accordingly, 
under either version of the second prong of State v. Troy or 
State v. Thomas, Mr. Quintana merits reconsideration of his claims 
and reversal of his convictions. The Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari should be granted to correct the errors and oversights by 
the Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, 
Mr. Andrew Quintana, requests that this Court grant his Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari and review his case. jj 
Respectfully submitted this /Q day of December, 1989. 
/ fTz^H 
rNN R. BROWN 
Lttorney^fror D e f e n d a n t ^ A p p e l l a n t 
IARD G. UDAY 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant Andrew R. Quintana appeals from the judgment and 
conviction of burglary and theft entered on a jury verdict. We 
affirm. 
According to the evidence presented at t r i a l , the Ted John 
family returned to their Sal t Lake County home on Emery Street 
from a two-day trip in the early evening of September 27, 1987. 
A note on their door informed them that the home had been 
burglarized and asked them to contact the po l i ce . After 
inventorying their belongings, Ted John reported that a vacuum 
cleaner worth $100 and stereo equipment worth $300 were missing. 
The vacuum cleaner was 3-4* high and 14-13" across at the base. 
The stereo equipment consisted of patch cords and three 
1, J. Robert Bullock, Senior Di s tr i c t Judge, s i t t ing by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(1) (j) (1987). 
Yamaha components, including an amplifier and cassette player 
(each measuring 14" wide by 6" tall by 10" deep and weighing 
10-15 lbs. and 4 lbs., respectively) and a tuner (measuring 14" 
by 3" by 10" and weighing 2 lbs.). 
At approximately 11:30 the same morning, Patricia Rains, a 
neighbor who lived across the street from the Johns, was 
returning from the grocery storeo As she turned onto her street, 
she noticed a burgundy Mazda pickup truck parked on the street 
and a man in a tank top and colorful Bermuda shorts looking at 
her from the porch of the Johns' home, approximately 30' away. 
In the course of unloading her groceries from her car, she saw 
the individual knock on the Johns' front door, wait for an 
answer, look in the picture window, and open the mailbox lid. 
Once inside her apartment, she continued to watch the man through 
her front bay window, approximately 85-100' from the Johns' front 
porch, along with her husband, Calvin Dean Rains. She saw the 
man walk off the porch and over to the burgundy truck. 
Calvin Dean Rains testified that, while looking out his 
apartment window for his wife on the morning of September 27, 
1987, he saw a man in a late-model, dark maroon Mazda or Nissan 
pickup truck, with lowered suspension and a broken front grille 
on the driver's side, park down the street from the Johns' home 
and walk up their driveway. The man was Spanish or Mexican, 
approximately 5'6" or 5'7" tall, in his mid-20's, with black 
semi-wavy hair. He wore multicolor Bermuda shorts and a baggy 
T-shirt with sleeves and an emblem on one side. The man went 
onto the porch, looked in the window, looked in the mailbox, 
opened the screen door, and tried the knob on the front door. He 
then returned to the truck and backed it down the street and 
around the corner out of sight. 
A few minutes later, Calvin Dean Rains went to his truck to 
return to the grocery store for some forgotten items. He pulled 
around the corner and spotted the same maroon pickup truck parked 
across from the alley that ran behind the Johns' home. 
Suspicious, he did a U-turn and stopped his own truck near the 
alleyway and waited a few minutes. From 75 or 80 yards away, he 
saw the man who had been on the front porch come out of the 
alleyway. When the man saw Rains, he immediately turned around 
and began walking in the opposite direction. After taking 
several steps, the man again turned around completely and walked 
directly to the burgundy Mazda. He looked like he was carrying 
something under his shirt because he had a large bulge under the 
left side of his baggy shirt that was supported by his arm. The 
man got into the pickup and, after a few moments, drove away past 
Rains• 
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Rains returned to his home and told his wife that someone 
had been robbed. They then went with another neighbor to the 
back of the Johns' home, where they found an open window and door 
and a screen on the grass. The tall weeds near the four foot 
high picket fence that separates the Johns' property from the 
alleyway had been trampled down, making it appear that someone 
had walked through them and climbed over the fence. They 
returned to their home and Patricia Rains called the police, 
providing a description of the man and the truck, the name Andy 
Quintana, and the license number 5600AK, which Calvin Rains had 
remembered and written down on a piece of paper. 
A police dispatch was sent out at about noon concerning a 
burglary at the John residence. The suspect was described as a 
male Hispanic with dark hair, approximately 5° 7" and 130 lbs. 
The vehicle was described as a maroon Mazda pickup, license 
number 5600AK, with chrome trim and damage to the grille area. 
The officer who responded to the dispatch did not recall being 
given the name of the man seen at the Johns' residence. 
When Officer Robert Robinson came on duty that afternoon, 
his supervisor told him of the burglary and gave him the vehicle 
description, the probable license plate number, and a description 
of the suspect as a short, male Hispanic in his twenties, wearing 
a shirt and shorts. He was also told that the suspect vehicle 
belonged to "the Quintanas," but he did not recall being given a 
first name. At 3:00 that afternoon, Officer Robinson stopped a 
truck fitting the description, but with license number 3600AK. 
The driver, who identified himself as Andrew R. Quintana, was 
wearing a blue pullover shirt and grey Bermuda shorts. Robinson 
checked the registration of the pickup and found that it was 
registered in the name of Jack N. Quintana, defendant's brother. 
The officer stated the reason for the stop. Defendant explained 
that he and the truck had been at his home all morning, a few 
blocks from where he was stopped, until he went to his sister's 
on Shannon Circle at about 2:00 p.m. to help move a washing 
machine- As the officer continued his questioning, defendant 
altered his story somewhat. When Robinson asked him if the 
pickup had been on Emery Street, defendant said that he had a 
sister, Irene, who lived on that street, but denied being there 
that day. Then he mentioned that he had helped a sister in the 
morning. By the end of the conversation with Officer Robinson, 
however, defendant had reverted to claiming he was at his own 
home all morning and had helped his sister on Shannon Circle in 
the afternoon. Robinson decided to impound the pickup and the 
patch cords he saw on the passenger's seat of the pickup, and 
defendant left on foot. 
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Defendant's sister, Gerline, testified that defendant had 
come to her home on Shannon Circle on either Saturday, September 
27, or Sunday, September 28, at about 1:45 p.m. to help move her 
washer and dryer. He was wearing grey shorts and a T-shirt. He 
was alone in the the maroon Mazda pickup, which she described as 
riding low to the ground. Defendant's mother testified that 
defendant lives with her and that she washes his clothing. She 
stated that defendant did not have any Bermuda shorts with 
multiple colors or any shorts that came down to his knees and no 
bulky tank tops or T-shirts with emblems or writing on them. 
When she and her husband left their home on September 27 at 10:15 
a.m., defendant was asleep; he was, as far as she knew, also 
asleep when they returned at about 11:45 a.m. She also verified 
that defendant has a sister, Irene, who lives around the corner 
from the Johns1 residence, but on Illinois Avenue, not Emery 
Street. 
Jack Quintana testified that he owned the maroon and chrome 
Mazda pickup, which rides low in the back and is missing a front 
grille, in which defendant was stopped. He identified the patch 
cords introduced by the State as his own, explaining that he uses 
them to connect a portable amplifier, which was introduced at 
trial, to his cassette player in the truck and to his stereo in 
his home. He had last seen the patch cords at the bottom of the 
truck seat on September 11, 1987, the day he was incarcerated as 
a result of a theft conviction that month. Finally, an 
investigator testified that the defendant is 5'4-3/4" tall in 
sneakers. 
I. 
At trial, Patricia Rains identified the man she saw on the 
Johns' porch as the defendant, asserting that she recognized him 
as Andy Quintana as soon as she saw him there and that she 
recognized the truck he was driving. She stated that sh€* 
provided the police with his name when she called them. When 
asked on cross-examination how she knew defendant, she said that 
she had never met him, but knew of him, and asserted that: he 
might have been to her home with her little sister, although she 
was not sure. In response to defense counsel's question about 
when the last time was that she had seen him prior to seeing him 
at the Johns' residence, she confusingly responded, "Two or three 
days ago." When pressed on redirect to explain how she put the 
name Andy Quintana on the face she saw on September 27, she 
stated that she was familiar with the face because she had seen 
him around. She suggested that he had been pointed out to her on 
the street and named by her sisters. She claimed that she had 
seen him several times before September 27. 
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During the investigation of the John burglary, Calvin Dean 
Rains was called to the police station to see if he could 
identify a suspect in the crime. Defendant was brought into a 
room by a police officer and walked past the desk at which Rains 
was sitting. Rains identified defendant as the man he had seen 
at the Johns residence on September 27. Because of the highly 
"suggestive nature of this identification process, the trial court 
granted defendant's pretrial motion to suppress and issued an 
order prohibiting the State from using the testimony of Calvin 
Dean Rains to identify Andrew Quintana. 
During the course of his opening statement to the jury, the 
prosecutor, Ernest Jones, told the jury of the Rainses' 
observations of a man on the Johns* porch and that Patricia Rains 
had told the police that she knew who the man was, i.e., the 
defendant Andrew Quintana. The prosecutor then stated, "Well, 
Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the defendant" and went on to decribe 
the man's movements on the porch and Mr. Rains's subsequent 
actions in getting into his own truck and eventually parking by 
the alleyway after seeing the maroon Mazda parked there. The 
prosecutor continued: "And he said that the defendant was out of 
sight. He didn't know exactly where the defendant had gone, but 
essentially he said he saw him come out." 
Defense counsel objected at this point, and a conference was 
held at the bench. When Jones continued his opening statement, 
he referred to the person seen by Rains coming out of the 
alleyway as "the man," not as "the defendant." At the close of 
the prosecutor's opening remarks, the jury was excused and 
defendant moved for a mistrial, asserting that the State had just 
accomplished an identification of the defendant by Mr. Rains 
through the prosecutor's statement that it was prohibited by 
court order from introducing through Mr. Rains's direct testimony. 
On appeal, Quintana contends that the prosecutor's remarks 
during opening statement constituted misconduct requiring 
reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial. The Utah 
Supreme Court has recently reiterated that a prosecutor's actions 
or remarks constitute misconduct meriting reversal if 
(1) the actions or remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters they would 
not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict and (2) under 
the circumstances of the particular case, 
the error is substantial and prejudicial 
such that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that in its absence there would have been 
a more favorable result for the defendant. 
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State v. Thomas, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25 (1989); accord State 
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987).2 
There is. no question that the prosecutor's statements 
concerning Mr. Rains's observations of defendant, quoted above, 
were highly improper in light of the court's pretrial order 
prohibiting the State from using any identification testimony 
by Mr. Rains. Thus, the first part of the test set forth in 
State v. Thomas is satisfied. However, although we do not 
condone the prosecutor's misconduct in this case, we conclude 
that his remarks did not substantially prejudice defendant 
under the circumstances. 
The improper remarks to the jury occurred in the first few 
minutes of this two-day trial. The prosecutor began his 
opening statement by telling the jury that the comments of 
attorneys during opening statements are not evidence. When he 
reached the point of describing how the Rainses watched a man 
on the Johns' front porch, he said that Patricia Rains told the 
police she knew the man was Andrew Quintana. The prosecutor 
then made the improper, but isolated, remarks about Mr. Rains 
seeing the defendant. After defendant's objection and the 
conference at the bench, the prosecutor restricted his 
references to Mthe man" in describing what Calvin Dean Rains 
saw and said. When defense counsel proceeded with his own 
opening statement, he again cautioned the jury that what the 
attorneys say is not evidence. During his subsequent 
testimony, Calvin Dean Rains described only what he observed 
and made no attempt to testify that the man he saw at the 
Johns' residence was, in fact, defendant. He did give 
permissible testimony that the man he saw on the front porch of 
the Johns' home was the same man he saw come out of the 
alleyway behind their home several minutes later with a Large 
bulge under his baggy shirt. It was Patricia Rains who 
identified defendant for the jury as the man she saw on the 
Johns' porch and who testified that she recognized him on the 
day of the burglary because his face was familiar to her. 
Although these surrounding circumstances and all the 
evidence presented at trial do not excuse the prosecutor's 
misconduct, they convince us that his remarks did not taint the 
2. Defendant does not contend that the prosecutor's remarks 
resulted in error amounting to a violation of his federal 
constitutional rights. Such errors require reversal unless 
they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tuttle, 
106 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 12 (1989). 
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proceedings to the extent that, if they had not occurred, there 
is any reasonable likelihood that the jury would have decided 
the case differently. See State v. Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, 6 (1989). 
II. 
Quintana next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his conviction for the burglary and theft at the Johns' 
residence. Specifically, he contends that there is 
insufficient evidence to identify him as the person who 
committed the crimes or to connect him with any of the property 
stolen from the Johns. 
In considering such a claim, we view the evidence presented 
and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Gardner, 101 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (1989). This court will reverse a jury 
conviction only when the evidence, viewed in this light, "'is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'M 
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah 1989) (quoting State 
v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988)). 
We reject Quintana's attack on Patricia Rains's 
identification of him as "inherently unreliable." She saw the 
man on the Johns' porch from only 30' away as she turned into 
her driveway, and she watched his actions from her driveway for 
several minutes. It is insignificant that Patricia Rains 
described the man as being just over an inch taller than 
defendant is in sneakers. It is equally uncompelling that, 
although she described the man as wearing bright, multicolored 
Bermuda shorts, defendant was stopped three hours later wearing 
grey shorts. He had ample opportunity and reason to change 
clothes in the interim. The jury did not have to believe his 
mother's testimony that he does not own the type of shorts 
described by the Rainses. 
In addition to Patricia Rains's in-court identification, 
the jury could also consider her testimony that she recognized 
the man on the porch as Andy Quintana as soon as she saw him 
there. She made it clear that she-had seen him several times 
in her neighborhood before September 27, 1987, and that 
defendant had been pointed out to her and named by one of her 
sisters. The likelihood of such an occurrence was highlighted 
by the testimony of defendant's mother that one of his sisters 
lived very near the Rainses. Although Patricia Rains was not 
very articulate in describing the basis for her recogition of 
defendant that day, her testimony was neither inconclusive nor 
improbable. 
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There is also sufficient evidence in the record from which 
the jury could find that defendant obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the Johns* property. A vacuum 
cleaner, three stereo components, and patch cords were 
missing. The three components, if stacked, measured 14" wide 
by 10" deep by 15" tall and weighed, at most, 21 lbs. The 
witnesses testified about the physical condition of the home 
and yard, from which it could be inferred that someone had 
broken into the house through the rear window, taken the Johns* 
property, left through the back door, walked through the weeds, 
and vaulted the picket fence, described by Ted John as being as 
tall or a little shorter than the courtroom railing.3 The 
man whom Calvin Dean Rains had initially seen on the front 
porch, identified as defendant by Rains*s wife, emerged from 
the alley behind the Johns* home a short time later with a 
large bulge under his shirt that could have been the stereo 
equipment. He acted suspiciously by changing directions after 
seeing Rains watching him and then promptly changing directions 
again. 
Defendant was later stopped in a truck substantially 
matching the Rainses* description, including all but one number 
in the license plate, with patch cords on the front seat. Ted 
John described these cords as similar to his own, although he 
could not positively identify them as his. Even without such a 
positive identification of the patch cords by Ted John, and 
even if the jury found that the patch cords introduced at trial 
belonged to defendant's brother, there was ample evidence from 
which the jury could find all the elements of theft as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978). 
Quintana's other two issues on appeal involve Jury 
Instruction 19, given over defendant's timely objections: 
Possession of recently stolen 
property, if not satisfactorily explained, 
is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
3. Ted John also described a gate in the fence, but the 
location of that gate in relation to the Johns* fence or the 
alley is unclear. The diagram to which he referred during his 
testimony, although introduced by the State at trial, is not in 
the record on appeal. 
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you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find, in light of the surrounding 
circumstances shown by the evidence of the 
case, that the person in possession knew 
the property had been stolen. 
Thus if you find from the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant was in possession of stolen 
property, that such possession was not too 
remote in point of time from the theft, 
and the defendant made no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession, then you 
may infer from those facts that the 
defendant committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if 
you find it justified by the evidence, to 
connect the possessor of recently stolen 
property with the offense of burglary. 
Quintana contends that the trial court erred by giving this 
instruction because there is no factual basis in the record to 
support it. See State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). He bases this argument on Ted John's failure to 
testify that the patch cords taken from the impounded truck 
were his patch cords. We believe there is adequate evidence in 
the record to support this instruction. In light of Ted John's 
identification of the cords as similar to his and the other 
testimony regarding the identification of defendant and his 
truck at the Johns' residence a few hours before he was 
stopped, there was evidence from which the jury could have 
concluded that the patch cords seized were, in fact, those 
stolen from the Johns. The jury was free to disbelieve Jack 
Quintana's testimony that the patch cords in evidence were his. 
Finally, defendant asserts that Instruction 19 violated his 
state and federal constitutional rights to due process because 
it created an irrebuttable presumption relieving the State of 
its burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We 
conclude that this issue is completely meritless. Instruction 
19 does not use the "prima facie evidence" language in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1978), which was held to create an 
unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption in State v. Chambers, 
709 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1985). The first paragraph of 
Instruction 19 does not create an irrebuttable presumption that 
the person who is inexplicably in possession of stolen property 
stole that property. Like the instruction held not to be 
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constitutionally defective in State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 
(Utah 1987), Instruction 19 simply allowed the jury to infer, 
if it found that the defendant was in possession of stolen 
property without satisfactory explanation, that he stole such 
property. Such an inference is not constitutionally 
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ADDENDUM C 
direct examination, State will cross-examine. After they 
have rested, the State may have some rebuttal witnesses, and 
the defense may have some surrebuttal witnesses. 
After both sides have rested, then the Court will 
read the instructions to you. After the instructions are 
read, then they both have an opportunity to make a closing 
statement to you. Since the State has the burden of proof, 
they will make the first opening statement. Then the de-
fense will have only one opportunity to address you. And 
they will have to anticipate what the State will say on 
rebuttal—after they have finished their closing statement, 
I should say, then the State will have an opportunity to 
make the final rebuttal closing statement. 
Then the matter will be submitted to you to 
deliberate on. I should advise you that if you wish to, you 
may take notes on this particular case. And when you take 
notes, do not share those notes with anyone else until you 
get into the jury room. And keep those notes confidential 
all during the course of the trial until you go out to 
deliberate. Okay. You may proceed. 
MR. JONES: Members of the jury, at the beginning 
of every trial, the Court always allows each party, both the 
prosecution and defense a chance to make what is called an 
opening statement. 
As Judge Uno told you, the comments of attorneys 
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[OPENING STATEMENT OF PROSECUTOR] 
1 during an opening statement, of course, are not evidence. 
2 Evidence comes from the witnesses who are called to testify, 
3 or it may come in the form of any exhibits that are received 
4
 in evidence. 
5 And the purpose of an opening statement is simply 
6 to give you an idea of what this case is all about, and to 
7 explain to you what we anticipate the testimony will be. As 
8 you know, this is a case involving burglary and theft. That 
9 is someone breaking into someone else's home and taking 
10 property that doesn't belong to them. This particular case 
11 happened just over a year ago or just under a year a g o — 
12 excuse me-—in September of 1987. And we will be offering 
13 this diagram of the area that's in question. 
14 The diagram essentially involves what is called 
15 Emery Street and Illinois Avenue here. What you have is a 
16 man named Ted John and his wife were living in this home at 
17 1162 Emery Street. They had left on, I think it was, Friday 
18 morning the 25th of September, and had been gone for a 
19 couple of days. And of course when they left, they locked 
20 up the home. Nothing was missing, nothing had been taken. 
2i When they came back on Sunday afternoon, sometime between 
22 4:00 and 6:00, they noticed there was a notice on the door, 
23 I essentially saying that the police had been there. 
24 And about the same time, one of the neighbors came 
25 over and in essence told Mr. John that, hey, somebody has 
14 
1 broken into your house. 
2 Well, Mr. John, of course, started to do an inven-
3 tory inside the home. And essentially what he discovered 
4
 missing was his stereo system. There was an amplifier, a 
5 tuner and cassette player. All of these items were valued 
6 at, oh, somewhere between seven and $900. In addition they 
7 discovered that of all things a vacuum cleaner had been 
8 taken in this burglary. 
9 I Mr. John discovered that someone had removed one 
10 of the screens on the window in the kitchen, and concluded 
11 that that was probably the point of entry. 
12 The police had already been there, had already 
13 dusted the house for fingerprints, and had left. He, of 
14 course, contacted the police and gave them some information. 
15 One of the things that the investigators dis-
16 covered in working on the case—the police department—was 
17 that across the street from Ted's house—they live at 1162, 
18 and it is here 1173—that is a duplex—a young couple named 
19 Dean and Patricia Rains lived. And the officer talked to 
20 Dean and Patricia, and Mr. and Mrs. Rains said that on 
21 Sunday morning at about eleven, 11:30, right in this area, 
22 that they had observed a man coming down the street and 
23 j coming up on the porch here at the home that belonged to Ted 
24 John. 
25 J Mrs. Rains told the officers that she knew who 
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1 that man was. It was this defendant, Andrew Quintana. She 
2 said that he went up on the porch for a few minutes. Ee 
3 appeared to be looking through the windows. Then he went 
4
 over by the door, spent a couple of minutes at the door, 
5 then he came down off the porch. 
6 Well, Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the defendant. 
7 Ke came down off the porch and he came back up to the 
8 corner. Near the corner of Emery and Illinois, he had 
9 parked there a small 1983 Mazda pickup. And they said that 
10 he got into the pickup and then he backed across the street, 
11 through the intersection of Illinois and Emery, made a 
12 right-hand turn, which would be sending him westbound, and 
13 parked the car down in this vicinity. Down at the end of 
14 the diagram. 
15 Mr. Rains, of course, was curious to know what he 
16 was doing. He said there was something just not right, and 
17 so what happened is Mr. Rains got into his vehicle and drove 
18 up to the corner and came this same way, westbound along 
19 Illinois. Ke said that he noticed the pickup parked approx-
20 imately here. 
2i Now, this area on the diagram is an alleyway. It 
22 I is not a very biq alley. He couldn't drive a car or truck 
down it. There was a lot of weeds and debris and everything 
24 I in the alleyway. 
25 I Mr. Rains came down, made a U-turn and parked on 
16 
23 
1 the other side of the Illinois Street, right next to that 
2 alley. And he said that the defendant was out of sight. Ee 
3 didn't know exactly where the defendant had gone, but 
4
 essentially he said he saw him come out. 
5 MR. BROWN: Excuse me. I object to that argument, 
6 Your Honor. May we approach the bench? 
7 THE COURT: Yes. 
8 (Conference at the bench.) 
9 I MR. BROWN: Thank you. 
10 MR. JONES: By the way, Mr. Rains, as I mentioned, 
11 is sitting here in his vehicle, and he sees this man come 
12 out in the area here on the diagram, which is almost adja-
13 cent to where Ted John lives. And he said that when the man 
14 came out, he appeared to be wearing some kind of a baggy 
15 shirt, something like a large T-shirt. Appeared there was 
16 something up underneath that T-shirt. He said that initial-
17 ly when he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for a 
18 minute, almost as if he was going to turn and go the other 
19 way. Then he turned around and came back down the alleyway. 
20 He walked right in front of Mr. Rains and went 
21 over and got into something inside that 1983 Mazda pickup 
22 and took off. 
23 J Well, Mr. Rains went back to his wife, told her to 
24 I call the police, and then he went over to Ted John's house 
25 I and discovered that the back door was opened and went in and 
17 
1 appeared someone had been in there, inside the house. He 
2 waited and the police eventually arrived. 
3 One of the things that Mr. Rains was able to do 
* was to jot down a license plate number for this 1983 pickup 
5 truck. He wrote that down and gave that information to the 
6 police department. 
7 Later that same afternoon, about 3:00, there was 
8 an Officer Robinson who was on duty, and had received some 
9 of the information concerning this burglary, which had been 
10 reported about 11:30 or 12:00c Officer Robinson, observed a 
n vehicle matching the description of the one which had been 
12 reported, a maroon 1983 Mazda pickup. 
13 He stopped the vehicle. The person who was 
14 driving the vehicle was Andrew Quintana. There was no one 
15 else in the vehicle. 
16 He conducted a search and found nothing in the 
17 vehicle as far as the property which had been reported 
18 missing. 
19 Members of the jury, that in essence is the case. 
20 The property was not recovered. It never has been re-
2i covered. But I submit to you that the evidence you have in 
22 this case tells you that there is only one person who is 
23 actually responsible for the break-in, the burglary, the 
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jury step out one moment. There is a motion that defense 
wishes to make at this time. 
(Jury outside the courtroom.) 
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, at this time, pursuant to 
our conversation at the side bar, the Court indicated that 
I could make a motion at this time and have the same force 
and effect as if it had been made when we approached the 
bench; is that correct? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BROWN: And the reason I ask to approach the 
bench at that time, Your Honor, is because Mr. Jones, in his 
opening statement, indicated—told the jury that Mr. Rains 
saw the defendant when he made reference to the defendant 
coming out of the alley. Ke said that Mr. Rains saw the 
defendant. Now, that's critical because the Court, on a 
prior motion of the defendant, has suppressed the witness 
identification of Mr. Rains, and has signed an order that 
Mr. Rains cannot make any identification of the defendant. 
Canft make an eyewitness identification of the defendant. 
Mr. Jones's statement to the jury certainly, 
19 
ADDENDUM D 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor's opening statement constituted misconduct 
when, in direct contradiction to the trial court's order suppressing 
a witness1 identification of Mr. Quintana, the prosecutor informed 
the jurors that the witness in question saw Mr. Quintana, thereby 
connecting in the minds of the jurors the identification evidence he 
could not legally elicit from the witness. The prosecutor's 
misconduct prejudiced Mr. Quintana and requires reversal of his 
convictions and a new trial ordered. 
Insufficient evidence was presented to justify the 
convictions for Burglary and Theft, requiring that Mr. Quintana's 
convictions be reversed and the charges against him be dismissed. 
Over the objection of counsel, the trial court gave an 
instruction to the jury which was without a factual basis and which 
relieved the State of its burden to prove each and every element of 
the crimes charged against Mr. Quintana. That instruction violated 
Mr. Quintana's constitutional rights and he suffered prejudice 
requiring that his convictions be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN THIS CASE 
PREJUDICED MR. QUINTANA'S RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY 
FAIR TRIAL AMD REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS 
CONVICTIONS. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Quintana filed a motion to suppress 
the identification testimony of Mr. Calvin Dean Rains (R. 24-28; see 
- 9 -
Addendum A). Mr. Rains had been informed by police officers that a 
suspect in the burglary/theft case was in custody, and Mr. Rains had 
been brought down to the station to see if he could make a positive 
identification (R. 24-28, 34-35). Police sat Mr. Rains at a desk 
and then walked Mr. Quintana past him; no other suspects were walked 
in front of Mr. Rains (R. 26-28, 33-35). Mr. Quintana urged that 
the subsequent identification of him by Mr. Rains was obtained in an 
unconstitutional manner and moved the Court to suppress that 
identification testimony (R. 24-28). The trial court took the 
motion under advisement (R. 39) and later issued an order granting 
the motion to suppress the witness1 identification of Mr. Quintana 
(R. 40; see Addendum B). The order stated: 
On motion of the defendant and good cause 
appearing it is hereby ordered that the motion to 
suppress witness identification is granted. 
The Court finds that the identification 
procedure used in this case was suggestive and the 
State is prohibited from using the testimony of 
Mr. Dean Rains at any subsequent proceedings to 
identify Mr. Andrew Quintana (R. 40). 
During his opening statement, the prosecutor told the 
jury that Mr. Rains informed the police that the burglar was this 
defendant, Andrew Quintana, and that Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the 
defendant on the porch of the John home until he left the area and 
parked down at the end of the street (R. 118 at 15-16). The 
prosecutor explained that Mr. Rains was curious to know what was 
happening because something was "not right" (R. 118 at 16). He 
stated that Mr. Rains got into his car and drove to the corner near 
the alleyway which ran behind the John home (R. 118 at 16-17). The 
- 10 -
prosecutor explained that Mr. Rains parked next to that alley 
(R. 118 at 17). The prosecutor then stated: "And [Mr. Rains] said 
that the defendant was out of sight. [Mr. Rains] didn't know 
exactly where the defendant had gone but essentially he said he saw 
him come out [of the alley from behind the John home]" (R. 118 at 
17). Counsel for Mr. Quintana immediately objected and asked to 
approach the bench; a sidebar conference was then held (R. 118 at 
17). 
Returning to his opening statment, the prosecutor 
continued: 
By the way, Mr. Rains, as I mentioned, is 
sitting here in his vehicle, and he sees this man 
come out in the area here on the diagram, which is 
almost adjacent to where Ted John lives. And he 
said that when the man came out, he appeared to be 
wearing some kind of a baggy shirt, something like 
a large T-shirt. Appeared there was something up 
underneath that T-shirt. He said that initially 
when he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for 
a minute, almost as if he was going to turn and go 
the other way. Then he turned around and came 
back down the alleyway. 
He walked right in front of Mr. Rains and 
went over and got into something inside that 1983 
Mazda pickup and took off. 
Well, Mr. Rains went back to his wife, 
told her to call the police, and then he went over 
to Ted John's house and discovered that the back 
door was opened and went in and appeared someone 
had been in there, inside the house. He waited 
and the police eventually arrived (R. 118 at 
17-18; see complete opening statement of 
prosecutor at Addendum C). 
After the prosecutor concluded his opening statement, 
counsel for Mr. Quintana requested that the jury be excused so that 
he could make a motion before he delivered his opening statement 
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(R. 118 at 19). The Court obliged and defense counsel then moved 
for a mistrial (R. 118 at 19-21). Counsel urged that the prosecutor 
had just accomplished for Mr. Rains what the Court had ordered could 
not be done, to wit: planted in the minds of the jurors that 
Mr. Rains saw Mr. Quintana coming out of that alleyway (R. 118 at 
19-20; see Addendum D for mistrial motion, argument and ruling). 
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, stating: 
THE COURT: Based on what has been argued, 
the Court is going to deny the motion. Court will 
either make a curative instruction, but I believe 
the Court has already told the jurors that the 
only evidence that they are to consider is the 
evidence that's heard form the witness stand. So 
as the evidence comes out in arguments that are 
made you will have to—that will have to be tied 
in, and I don't think it can be tied in as far as 
the evidence is concerned. 
So the motion will be denied (R. 118 at 
21). 
Mr. Quintana insists that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, and he maintains that 
the prosecutor's remarks constitute misconduct and in and of 
themselves require that Mr. Quintana's convictions be reversed and 
the case remanded for a new trial. 
Case law espousing the duties and obligations of 
prosecutors is legion. Several such directives merit mentioning. 
We have previously stated that the State 
while charged with vigorously enforcing the laws 
has a duty to not only secure appropriate 
convictions, but an even higher duty to see that 
justice is done. In his role as the State's 
representative in criminal matters, the 
prosecutor, therefore, must not only attempt to 
win cases, but must see that justice is done. 
Thus, while he should prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor, it is as much his duty to refrain from 
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improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means 
to bring about a just one. 
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
The purpose of an opening statement is to 
advise the jury of the facts relied upon and of 
the questions and issues involved, which the jury 
will have to determine, and to give them a general 
picture of the facts and the situations, so that 
they will be able to understand the evidence. 
Counsel should outline generally what he intends 
to prove, and should be allowed considerable 
latitude. He should make a fair statement of the 
evidence and the extent to which he may go is 
largely in the discretion of the trial court. He 
should not make a statement of any facts which he 
cannot legally prove upon the trial; nor should he 
argue the merits of his case, or relate the 
testimony at length. 
State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (Utah 1941) (citations omitted; 
emphasis added); accord United States v. Signer, 482 F.2d 394, 
398-99 (6th Cir. 1973), and cases cited therein. 
[A prosecutor] may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor—indeed he should do so. 
But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at 
liberty to strike foul ones. It is . . . his duty 
to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
In this case, the prosecutor violated the above tenets by 
advancing in his opening statement the concept that his witness saw 
Mr. Quintana in the alley behind the John residence emerging with a 
bulge under his shirt—presumably of stolen goods. The trial court 
had ordered that Mr. Rains was prohibited from identifying 
Mr. Quintana at any subsequent proceedings because the 
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suggestiveness of the procedure used to obtain that identification 
rendered it unreliable. In advancing that the witness saw 
Mr. Quintana, the prosecutor placed in the jurors' minds the 
identification of Mr. Quintana by Mr. Rains in direct contravention 
of the Court's order. The prosecutor stated as fact something he 
knew he could not legally establish at trial. 
Because the statement violated the court order, the 
prosecutor cannot claim the error was made either unintentionally or 
somehow in good faith. An examination of United States v. Johnson, 
767 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985), dispells this remote possibility. In 
Johnson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals instructed'that 
prosecutor misconduct "made during an opening statement makes it 
more egregious than a similar remark would be during closing 
argument." Ld. at 1274. The Court clarified that certain 
improprieties during closing arguments can be excused as a product 
of provocation but that an opening statement does not occur in such 
a charged atmosphere and is usually presumed to be carefully 
planned. Id. 
Nor can this Court permit the misconduct to stand because 
the opening statements of counsel are not evidence—as urged by the 
prosecutor and adapted by the trial court as basis to deny the 
mistrial motion. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court, in a case where 
improper remarks of the prosecutor during opening statements were 
found to be reversible error, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1984), reiterated the standard governing reversals for improper 
statements of the prosecutor. The Court stated: 
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The test of whether the remarks made by counsel 
are so objectionable as to merit reversal in a 
criminal case is, [1] did the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict, and [2] were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influenced by those remarks. 
Id. at 486 (citing inter alia State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 
(Utah 1973). 
Applying this test to Mr. Quintanafa case demonstrates 
the prosecutor's misconduct merits reversal. The first prong of the 
test is met because the prosecutor's statement called to the 
attention of the jurors a fact which had been suppressed by the 
trial court and ordered inadmissible because of the violation of 
Mr. Quintana's constitutional rights to due process and a fair 
trial. The prosecutor's statement disclosed to the jurors that, 
contrary to the court order barring the information, Mr. Rains 
identified Mr. Quintana as the man in the alley behind the John home 
with a bulge under his shirt. The jurors were not entitled to hear 
that information. 
The second prong—whether the jurors were influenced by 
that information—is equally clear. Because this case was conceded 
by all to have been an identification case (R. 83-86; R. 118 at 
19-21), the statement that Mr. Rains saw Mr. Quintana in the alley 
behind the John residence with a bulge under his shirt provided the 
jurors with an inference that the bulge might have been missing 
property which might have come from the John home. This information 
"probably influenced the jurors" because no other information came 
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as close to placing Mr, Quintana in the home, to establish the 
burglary, or in possession of property belonging to the John family, 
to establish the theft. 
Inasmuch as the standard governing reversals for improper 
statements of the prosecutor has been met, Mr. Quintana urges this 
Court to find the remarks of the prosecutor in this case tD merit 
reversal of his convictions for Burglary and Theft and for this 
Court to remand his case for a new trial. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS OF 
MR. QUINTANA. 
Mr. Quintana maintains that the evidence adduced at trial 
is unable to support the convictions of Burglary and Theft. He 
requests this Court to examine the sufficiency of the evidence, 
reverse his convictions, and remand his case to the trial court with 
an order dismissing the charges against him. In State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[N]ot 
withstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision, this 
court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict." Further, the Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime for 
which he was convicted. 
Id. This standard restates the due process requirement which 
prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond 
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